

Supplementary material for

Cooperators Pay More Attention to the Outcome of Mutual Cooperation in the One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Empirical Evidence From an Eye-Tracking Study

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Table S1. Means and standard deviations for self-reported desirability scores and the difference in scores between CC (mutual cooperation) and DD (mutual non-cooperation) by condition and participants' decision.

	control condition (n=24)		inverted payoff matrix condition (n=24)	
	cooperator (n=9)	defector (n=15)	cooperator (n=8)	defector (n=16)
CC desirability ratings	6.778 (0.441)	6.133 (1.125)	6.500 (0.756)	6.188 (0.981)
CD desirability ratings	1.111 (0.333)	1.067 (0.258)	1.250 (0.463)	1.188 (0.403)
DC desirability ratings	5.111 (2.028)	5.867 (1.598)	4.875 (1.959)	5.438 (5.438)
DD desirability ratings	2.667 (1.225)	4.267 (1.486)	3.375 (1.408)	5.250 (1.732)
Difference scores between CC and DD	4.111 (1.054)	1.867 (1.302)	3.125 (1.246)	0.938 (1.289)

Note. The desirability ratings were measured using the 7-point Likert scale. We performed an analysis of variance for the difference scores between CC and DD, with conditions (control/inverted payoff matrix) and participants' decisions (cooperator/defector) as independent variables and found a main effect of condition, $F(1, 44) = 6.457$, $p < .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .13$ and a main effect of participants' decision, $F(1, 44) = 34.573$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .44$.